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Abstract
The paper employs the philosophical basis ofWerner Heisenberg's uncertainty
principle of quantum mechanics to analyze the fictional strategy of Thomas Pynchon's The
Crying ofLot 49. Uncertainty is not merely a scientific metaphor in the novel, but an
actual condition of the reader's experience ofthe text. Oedipa's confrontation ofthe
uncertainty ofthe Tristero mirrors the reader's confrontation ofPynchon's novel. Though
it has become somewhat commonplace to discuss "uncertainty" and quantum phenomena
in Gravity's Rainbow, there is little discussion of The Crying ofLot 49 as an example of
"quantum fiction." Through a demonstration ofthe uncertainty principle in Pynchon's'
earlier novel, we will see how it informs conclusions about Pynchon's later novels. More
broadly, the analysis ofuncertainty in The Crying ofLot 49 indicates a collapse ofthe
opposition between literature and criticism in postmodern writing, a collapse which points
less to a new "postmodern" way ofviewing literature and criticism than to more ancient
models such as the Kabbalah.
I
All Postmodemists Are Liars:
The Uncertainty Principle in The Crying ofLot 49 and Beyond
A Thesis, or Several
Isaac Newton, whose physics were largely debunked by quantum theory,
ironically expressed our predicament in the quantum age best: "I seem to have been only
like a boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a
smoother pebble or a prettier shell than the ordinary, while the great ocean of
undiscovered truth lay all undiscovered before me" (Heisenberg, Nature 9). Newton
anticipated the problem ofhis prodigal heirs Werner Heisenberg and Neils Bohr in all but
one important respect. The great ocean holds not undiscovered truth but truth
undiscoverable. Not unlike fiction and criticism, quantum physics is a field where it seems
that the more you discover, the more you discover you haven't yet discovered or cannot
discover..
I allude to the celebrated uncertainty principle, developed in 1926 by Heisenberg
and Bohr working from the ideas ofMax Plank, the acknowledged founder ofquantum
mechanics, the field ofphysics dealing with subatomic phenomena. Heisenberg and Bohr
were themselves the first to see that the abstruse equations ofquantum theory, addressing
f
bewildering questions of reality, time, space, creation and destruction, had broader
repercussions in fields previously thought to have little to do with the. l reali1¥" ofthe hard
sciences -- religion, philosophy, aesthetics and literature. 1 Almost immediately after
publishing their mathematical discoveries, Heisenberg and Bohr, today considered
philosophers as much as physicists, extrapolated the epistemological implications oftheir
2
own work, implications particularly relevant to postmodern fiction like Thomas Pynchon's
The Cryi'!g ofLot 49.
Oedipa Maas' strange quest through California to discover an 800-year-old
conspiracy and execute a will in the process is for her and Pynchon's reader alike a
sometimes frustrating, sometimes enlightening labor in uncertainty. She progresses
through three stages ofher quest that demonstrate entertainingly the operation ofthe
Heisenberg principle in her own life and in the life of entropic postmodern America. At the
outset ofher quest, Oedipa, like a faithful Newtonian, holds fast to the beliefthat there is
some.factual truth out there, somewhere, to be found. As she moves into the second
vertiginous stage, she finds that her attempts to find this transcendent truth result only in
frustration, confusion, and uncertainty. Suspecting herself paranoid, she becomes
conscious ofthe subjectivity ofher own search and slowly realizes that all she will
ultimately discover is the "observation-event," reality, factual or not, refracted through her
own perception. In the third stage, rather than submitting to nihilistic despair, she
simultaneously accepts the mutually exclusive explanations of the Tristero mystery and
views her quest as ending not in contradiction and failure, but in a new, qu~tum-like,
non-rationalistc, semi-schizophrenic; perception ofa mutifaceted reality.
. . I
Pynchon, perhaps more than any other American writer, uses physics as both the
subject and the aesthetic principle ofhis fiction. "Pynchon is still thought to have proved,"
John Limon remarks,. "that modern literature must make poetry out ofequations and
chemical bonds" (Limon 1). We will see that the uncertainty principle nearly accomplishes
this feat on its own. Pearce further explains that "the more we learn about modem physics,
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Ithe better we understand Pynchon's novels -- not only thematically but structurally as well"
~earsel1~l. Th~f;rying ofLot 49, like the Heisenberg Principle, challenges the
-- -- -------------- - ----- --._- -.--
conviction that some kind of "truth" or unimpeachable governing knowledge can be
attained through rational inquiry and observation. Throughout the novel, Oedipa
continually tries to sort out the confusions, collate the details, relate endless and
conflicting significances, translate the hieroglyphs, and rise above the chaos to a stable
point of reference where all secrets are revealed and the conspiracy is solved. Heisenberg
demonstrates that although such a reference point would be comforting to us, it
unfortunately does not exist. Oedipa Maas' attempts to solve the mystery o~y complicate
it further. Her observation reveals no knowledge or truth, but only multiplying
uncertainties and new perpetually shifting "truths." There are as many suppositions of the
identity ofthe secret bidder, as there are interpretations ofthe "meaning" of The Crying of
Lot 49, all expressions of creativity, all "futile" searches for truth.
Though it has become somewhat commonplace to discuss "uncertainty" and
quantum phenomena in Gravity's Rainbow, there is little discussion of The Crying ofLot
49 as an example of "quantum fiction, II or "actualism", as Susan Strehle calls it. Through a
demonstration of the uncertainty principle in its philosophical form at work in Pynchon's
earlier novel, we will see perhaps how it informs conclusions about Pynchon's later novels,
such as Thomas Moore's that the reader finds no "truth" in Gravity's Rainbow, but "only
that fugitive sort of 'visibility' where either/or distinctions have no fixed meaning" (Moore
184). More broadly, we will begin to see the crumbling, or at least the cracking, in the
4
wall between literature and criticism in postmodem writing and speculate what this
cracking implies for literature, criticism, and perhaps for this paper.
Heisenberg Projects a World
For a "quantumll analysis of The Crying ofLot 49, it suffices to understand the
uncertaintY principle in terms of a few key elements: complementarity, subjectivity, and
the relation ofquantum phenomena to ambiguous or poetic language. I will take the time
to outline each ofthese in some detail, since each has a direct bearing on Pynchon's text.
What Heisenberg discovered in uncertainty was no less than the limit ofhuman
knowledge or at least the objective knowledge science seeks to provide. Reality in the
subatomic quantum world, he found, was not the same as reality in the larger Newtonian
world. This became apparent when Heisenb~rg discovered that the tools of?bservation,
beyond a certain point, alter the particles under observation. He summarizes:
It was discovered· that it was impossible to describe simultaneously both the
position and velocity of an atomic particle with any prescribed degree of
accuracy. We can either measure the position very accurately -- when the
action ofthe instrument used for observation obscures our knowledge ofthe
velocity, or we can make accurate measurements ofthe velocity and forego
knowledge ofthe position . . . This formulation makes it quite clear that we
cannot make much headway with the concepts ofNewtonian mechanics, since
in the calculation of a mechanical process it is essential to know simultaneously
the position and velocity at a particular- moment, and this is precisely what
quantum theory considers to be impossible (Heisenberg, Nature 39-40).
Moreover, no advance in technology will improve the situation, since the fundamental
problem exists in the act of observation itself Quantum reality reacts to its o~server in
such a way that every observation creates a new system.
5
Things are then complicated by the subjectivity that uncertainty imposes on the act
of"objective" obsery~tion. 'I'he_r~s1.!lts_9tanexperiment are_determinednotonlyby_the_ ... _ _
instruments of observation but also by the choices the observer makes on what to observe
and how and when to observe it. The observation ofvelocity reveals a diffe~ent system
than the observation ofposition. As Paul Davies puts it, "know one and you un-know the
other" (Davies 162). The scientist's interaction with what he chooses to observe then is
essentially a subjective one because "what we observe is not nature in itselfbut nature
exposed to our method of questioning" (Heisenberg, Philosophy 58). Nature, like a text
under interpretation, will only offer up what we search for and what we search for tells us
more about ourselves, after all, than about nature. For better or worse, the scientist
assumes a more participatory role in his environment as his work in a sense creates the
reality he observes rather than simply mirroring it. "Science no longer confronts nature as
an objective observer but sees itself as an actor in this interplay between man and nature . .
. method and object can no longer be separated. The scientific world view has ceased to
be a scientific view" (Heisenberg, Nature 29). Strehle then assesses the implications of
such an epistemological inversion: "objective and subjective meet in the human
interpretation ofnonhuman reality. When the scientist, for centuries typifying . . . passive
observation, becomes an actor in the interplay, the entire set of relations between mind
and world has changed" (Strehle 13).
Heisenberg proved that matter cannot be observed without fundamentally altering
the object under scrutiny. Because uncertainty challenges empiricism and the philosophical
basis ofthe scientific method at its roots, questions ofinterpretation and subjectivity,
6



)connected, provides the basis for Pynchon's view ofa universe in which individuals have
'.
free will and are mystically connected to each otherII (Schladt 3593A). Those who' share
this view believe that uncertainty, albeit an alluring metaphor, IIhas no direct bearing on
our struggles with the textll and does not preclude any II systematic readingII or discemable
•governing truth (Burne 190). Quantum mechanics is an apt metaphor for the non-quantum
uncertainty ofhuman interaction with technology, with chaos, and with each other, but
plays no actual role in the creation ofthe textual universe, the IY.,ultiplicity of
complementary meanings.
I think though that there is still too much ofthe physicist in Pynchon for him to
treat quantum reality as simply an II analogue, II and that quantum theory, by its nature, has
an impact on fiction more actual than metaphoric. Hume's view may be clouded in one
important respect. Quantum theory, at least as Heisenberg expresses it, does not recognize
the opposition ofthe IIscientificII language oftheuncertainty-relationsand-the--"fictional"
language ofa text. Both are expressions ofpotentiality, ambiguity and image, lIa language
that produces pictures in our mind. II The uncertainty principle, having as much to do with
language as with subatomic particles, necessarily produces an IIactualII impact on the
process offiction writing, on the creation ofa textual reality, and necessarily complicates
Hume's IIsystematic readingII and search ofa single governing meaning or IItruthll in novels
like The Crying ofLot 49 and Gravity's Rainbow. Susan Strehle specifically identifies such
IIpost-Newtonianll works that invoke the demon uncertainty as lIactualistic fiction," as if to
denote the sudden collision of our poetic imagination with our understanding of IIreality. II
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Ancient schools of mysticism such as the Kabbalah suggest a more basic question: why did
we oppose "imagination" and "knowledge" in the first place?
1111 return to this later; for now it seems clear enough that the role ofuncertainty in
Pynchon's fictional text is more than metaphoric. Bohr and Heisenberg recognized that
because of its subjective methodology, quantum theory is better expressed in the
ambiguous "natural language" ofphilosophy and poetry than in a mathematics which
grasps for an exactitude that is impossible on the subatomic level. From this'unlikely
affinity between quantum theory and poetic language we can easily see how uncertainty,
more than in metaphoric ways, can be.utilized by literary criticism and postmodern fiction.
Rather than denying ambiguity and resisting uncertainty in favor ofa clear and
comfortable "meaning," they revel in it.
Strehle, perhaps better than any other critic, makes the unpredictable quantum leap
from subatomic p\ysics topostmodemfiction, from"factual reality~ to."imaginative ..
fantasy." As I mentioned, she denotes the movement in fiction directly connected to the
Heisenberg principle as "actualism":
I derive the term "actualism" from a distinction Werner Heisenberg makes
between the actual and the real. At the subatomic level, he says, reality is not
real, but it is active, dynamic, "actual" ... Actualistic fiction and contemporary
physics join, I propose, in seeing the external world and the human relation to
it as: discontinuous/statistical!energetic/relative/subjective/uncertain" (Strehle
7-8).
The Crying ofLot 49, we will see, is an interesting example ofthe actualistic fiction
Strehle speaks of in that it develops as fictional motifs several ofthese terms, "statistical,"
"subjective" and "uncertain," which we have already seen in the description ofthe
11
uncertainty principle. In discussing quantum theory and its relation to Pynchon's work,
Pearce asks, "How do we relate all this to literature?" and answers himself,
Well, for material objects [particles] moving through space, let us substitute
characters. And for force, let us substitute action. In the classical novel we
watch the way characters affect other characters. . .We describe the course of
action in terms ofcause and effect ... In postmodem ... it cannot be causally
explained ... What we find are symmetries: diametrical oppositions of
continuity and discontinuity, distancing and involvement, closure and openness
(pearce 150-1).
A text such as Pynchon's means nothing and at the same time means many things. His
characters may interact for reasons ofplot or they might interact for no particular reason.
Their search, like that ofthe quantum physicist, obscures truth as it discovers it and
achieves insight and lack of insight in the same discovery.
Glamorous Annihilation
Not only does Oedipa's situation reflect the uncertainty principle, but Pynchon's
fictional re-creation ofuncertainty entangles the reader as well, and in doing so reaches
beyond the realm of the "metaphoric" into the IIactual. " Like so many other postmodem
fictions, The Crying ofLot 49 compounds the narrative with a reflexive level that causes
the reader to question even his or her own role in the text.5 The reader cannot observe
Oedipa from a dissociated objective vantage point, but like the quantum scientist,
"becomes an actor in this interplay" who not only reads about Oedipa's uncertainty but is
forced to share it and like her, must interpret or create the result of the quest subjectively.
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At the beginning of her experiment, we find that Oedipa Maas, caricature ofthe
complacent housewife, is reasonably confident that the[e will ~~ a rati()!1~ result fi:"om her
endeavors, that there is an objective transcendent truth to be discovered so long as she has
sufficient diligence to pursue it. Even as the absent object ofher quest, "Pierce Inverarity"
suggests that Oedipa must pierce through the untruths, slice through the deceptions, to get
to what must be some kernel of objective fact at the heart ofmystery she suspects her
ex-lover has weaved.
Already sensible of the "formless magic" which she must either comprehend and
"measure its field strength" or "go mad, or marry a disc jockei' (Crying 22) in the
process, Oedipa overlooks the circuit-like expanse of San Narciso, with its "hieroglyphic
sense ofconcealed meaning, of an intent to communicate" (C 24). She assumes that the
landscape sprawled before her conceals accessible truth, ifnot in its weapons factories,
trendy bars, or man-made lagoons decorated with authentic human skeletons, in the blue
ocean beyond, because "no matter what you did to its edges the true Pacific stayed
inviolate and integrated or assumed the ugliness at any edge into some more general truth"
(C 55). Oedipa clings to the possibility ofthis general truth as the Tristero tapestry begins
to unfold around her. After hearing the story ofthe GI's pinned down at Lago di Pieta,
Osteolysis Inc., and later watching the Lost Guard ofFaggio suffer the same sinister fate
in The Courier's Tragedy, Oedipa tells Metzger, "I want to see if there's a connection. I'm
curious" (C 76). Again like the Newtonian observer, Oedipa presses toward an objective
understanding of reality, a "general truth" or "connection" that all her years of
13
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complacency tell her must exist. She does not yet understand her role as an actress in the
interplay or that her search will.create the connections as well as uncover them.
Only a little later, as she is drawn into the grotesquely comic world ofRichard
Wharfinger, does Oedipa begins to sense the ambiguity and uncertainty intrinsic in her
quest. She finds, watching the fourth act, "that things really get peculiar, and a gentle chill,
an ambiguity, begins to creep in among the words ... Certain things, it is made clear, will
not be spoken aloud; certain events will not be shown on stage" (C 71). Not only does this
I
moment prefigure her own experiences that will follow, but the sinister "ambiguity" at the
climax of the drama, the unfortunate Niccolo's "T-t-t-t-t. .. ", or "Trystero," also becomes
the uncertain object of her own observation.
Haunted by the uncertainty ofthese "shadowy and deformed" footpads, Oedipa
approaches Randolph Driblette, who she hopes will offer her some stable rational
viewpoint on her increasingly irrational quest. Instead, her conversation with Driblette
only contributes to her uncertainty. He tells her, "You can put together clues, develop a
thesis, or several, about why characters reacted to the Trystero possibility the way they
did, why the assassins came on, why the black costumes. You could waste your whole life
that way and never touch the truth. Wharfinger supplied words without a yarn. I gave
them life. That's it" (C 80). This dialogue between Oedipa and Driblette at the close of
chapter 3 is significant for several reasons. First, it pushes Oedipa into the second stage of
her Tristero quest, where she becomes conscious ofthe subjectivity ofher search and the
possibility that there is no "real truth" to be found. Driblette's explicit assertion that no
amount of diligent study will reveal any objective knowledge, along with his implication
14
that the characters ofthe play were given life, in this particular performance, by his own
subjective mind, suggests to Oedip_a that t~~ ~Il!Y trut~ ~~e_¥.Till. fi.E~ is !~e truth. she.
creates. This realization creeps into her mind as she scrawls in her memo book, IIShall I
project a world?1I (C 82). Second, the Driblette dialogue is the first clear evidence ofa
reflexive narrative level in The Crying ofLot 49. Driblette's advice is Pynchon's indirect
criticism ofcritics who would try to discover the truth in his entertaining little novel. We
might try, as I do here, to put together clues, develop a thesis about why Tristero
represents a totalitarian conspiracy, why Oedipa is paranoid, why Heisenberg's uncertainty
principle operates in the novel, or why the n~vel is reflexive, and never touch the truth.
As Oedipa drifts directionless into the second stage of her quest, she finds at every
tum that no IIreliableII source, no observation, no inquiry, no text, no footnote provides
any stable or transcendent truth, but only more levels ofkaleidoscopic significance. As a
result, she experiences a bottomless melancholy that results from a complete disorientation
ofmeaning, truth, and value. Even Maxwell's Demon, who can miraculously restore
energy and order to the universe, fails her. Clerk Maxwell's picture does not wink at her
because she is not lIa sensitiveII and the genius Nefastis seeks only to have sexual
intercourse. She does not yet see, perhaps, that love, the human connection, might be the
connection she seeks. IIWith coincidences blossoming these days wherever she looked ll (C
109), Oedipa rambles drunk and despairing through the twilight reality of San Francisco
IIAnd spent the rest ofthe night finding the image of the Trystero post homll (C 117) in
the logo of the Inamorati Anonymous, in a herbalist's window, chalked on a sidewalk (lla
secret history?II), on buses, in laundromats, on delinquents' jackets, in restrooms, in the
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skip-rope rhymes of children and on a sixty-year-old anarchist newspaper. She begins to
r~ali~e_~ha~ i!tis n~t nature ~n}!~e~~but "nature exposed to her method ofquestioning,"
not real objective truth, but the subjective truth she creates by her search. Just as
sub-molecular scrutiny only complicates our understanding ofthe matter, Oedipa's search
for the Tristero obscures in the process of discovering. Rather than uncovering the kernel
of truth at the heart of the apparent conspiracy, she fmds complementarity, "some
unthinkable order ofmusic, many rhythms, all keys at once" (C 131). Observation itself
-
changes the observed as Oedipa's search seems to weave more intricate designs into the
very mystery it intends to unravel. She begins to suspect that she is destroying evidence in
the worst way. "They are stripping away, one by one, my men," she reflects, "My shrink,
pursued by Israelis, has gone mad; my husband, on LSD ... my one extra-marital fella has
eloped with a depraved 15-year-old" (C 153).
At the pit of despair, Oedipa already knows that "at the end ofthis (if it were
supposed to end), she too might ... be left with only compiled memories ofclues,
announcements, intimations, but never the central truth itself, which must somehow each
time be too bright for her memory to hold; which must always blaze out, destroying its
own message irreversibly" (C 95). As she progresses to the third and final stage ofher
quest, she finally accepts the multiple truths of the Tristero and recognizes uncertainty as a
potential for interpretation and creativity rather than an unsurmountable obstacle to a
transcendent truth that does not exist. As Alan Friedman says in a similar analysis of
Gravity's Rainbow, "the uncertainty principle also means that no possibility can be ruled
16
out, and that there is hope that nature's constant reshutlling will produce desirable new
opportunitiesII (Friedman and Puetz 353).
At the end ofher experiment in uncertainty, when all possibilities are
simultaneously opened and closed, all information revealed and concealed, Oedipa
contemplates her findings:
Either way they'll call it paranoia. They. Either you have stumbled indeed,
without the aid ofLSD or other indole alkaloids, onto a secret richness and
concealed density of dream; onto a network by which X number ofAmericans
are truly communicating . . . Or you are hallucinating it. Or a plot has been
mounted against you, so expensive and elaborate, involving items like the
forging of stamps and ancient books ... planting ofpost hom images all over
San Francisco ... so labyrinthine that it must have meaning beyond just a
practical joke. Or you are fantasying some such plot, in which case you are a
nut, Oedipa, out ofyour skull. (C 170-71)
In the end, Oedipa goes to the stamp auction accepting all these truths as equally valid. Of
course_this is tb(lPynchgIl~sque ve~si_on ofthe principle of cOD1ple1!1ent~ty,~hich_holds
that multiple interpretations and pictures of phenomena, while they may be mutually
exclusive by rationalistic logic, are nonetheless complementary in the non-rationalistic,
quantum micro-world. Contradictory views reveal different aspects of reality. As Pearce
points out, 1I0edipa may have become a paranoiac and she may have discovered the
totalitarian underpinnings ofWestern democracyll (pearce 150). Like the spiritually elitist
and possibly delusional members ofthe Schurvamite sect who llwith a certain sick and
fascinated horrorII (C 155), gave themselves over to the IIglamorous annihilationll of the
secular world, Oedipa abandons her fading hope oftranscendent truth for her own vision,
where IIPossibilities for paranoia become abundantII (C 165). Any knowledge, Oedipa
17
realizes, she or anyone else appears to possess is only subjective knowledge, her own
narcissistic projection in an environment where Narcissus himself is the patron saint. She
- - - _. -- ------------------------_ .._------------ . - --------- --- -
does not surrender to despair and nihilism but rather opens herself to these "desirable new
opportunities." She decides to show up at the auction, where she is clearly an outsider,
almost indifferent to the identity of the secret bidder. In this we might call her heroic or as
heroic as one can be in an uncertain universe.
Heeding the advice ofthe gun-toting Dr. Hilarius, Oedipa decides to hold on to the
"fantasy" ofher subjective findings, "for when you lose it, you go over by that much to the
others. You begin to cease to be" (C 138). Hilarius here, himself a madman, tells us what
we probably suspected was inherent in the Heisenberg principle from the start, that
subjective observation is not necessarily unreliable and paranoid, but an expression of
identity and an act ofcreativity, the attempt to see more clearly an infinitely faceted
reality.
Are we then to interpret this as an answer to the problem Driblette posed to us,
Pynchon's readers and critics, from behind the shower curtain? Is my own essay on
Pynchon's novel a "fantasy" that expresses my subjectivity and identity? Would it be a
worthwhile task after all to fimsh this paper instead ofgoing out to play softball or join the
navy? Given Heisenberg's suggestion that any attempt to perceive ultimate reality or
transcendent truth is impossible, is any attempt by the human mind to engage reality
worthwhile? Well, why not? But tike Oedipa, we might not find exactly what we
expected. Pynchon invites his reader to share Oedipa's uncertainty by providing false
footnotes, intentional corruptions oftexts, distortions, irrelevancies, and finally, by leaving
18
the end open and the identity of the secret bidder, seated only a few feet away, a secret.
Pearce_notes a narratiye shift in theJm~ PCiges d~sign~~ to make us "actors in the
interplay." Here Pynchon and/or Oedipa addresses the reader directly as ifwe are drawn
into the novel to accompany Oedipa to·the auction: "Next day, with the courage you find
you have when there is nothing more to lose, she got in touch with C. Morris Schrift, and
inquired after his mysterious client" (C 182). Pearce argues that these narrative strategies
are invoked to make the reader's uncertainty as acute as his character's:
The ending ofLot 49 thrusts us into the moment when the quester's uncertainty
is most sharply focused and felt. . .It is just our being brought in so close to the
subject that creates the discontinuity and the uncertainty. Pynchon, his mind
imbued with quantum mechanics, develops a narrative strategy consistent with
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (Pearce 147, 149).
Yet while we share Oedipa's uncertainty, we might also share her acceptance of
complementary contradictions, her insight into a multi-faceted quantum reality where truth
is noflo6ming and monolithic but "actual, II kaleidoscopic and constantly changing.
Friedman and Puetz see this vision as the final hope in The Crying ofLot 49. They believe
that this and Pynchon's other novels suggest that paranoia, love, and irrationality might be
the best methods to grasp complementary contradictions of reality, just as poetic language
might be the best way to represent a quantum reality that is many things at once.
"Paranoia has to be the dominant condition ofthe human mind," they explain, in order to
comprehend a universe where "order and entropic chaos do not stand in final opposition
to each other ... but as elements of one and the same universal movement" (Friedman and
Puetz 358-59). This paper, for me, necessarily alters and recreates Pynchon's text and in a
19
very real sense, writes another version ofthe novel, or a new novel altogether. This is, I
think, the reflexive subtext ofthe novel and the essence ofthe uncertainty at the heart of
- - - - -- . -- -- -
quantum theory and actualistic fiction.
Peculiar Talk
Uncertainty, while liberating in many ways, also leaves us, who were weaned on
the Enlightenment ideal, with a nagging sense of dread, "condemned to be free," as Sartre
put it. It would be nice to surrender ourselves to the "glamorous annihilation" of
uncertainty, to open ourselves to infinite possibilities and the free play ofmeaning, but we
also slam The Crying ofLot 49 against our wall when we've finished because damn it, we
still want to. know who the secret bidder is. We all have a craving for truth, explanation,
and certainty and the thought that uncertainty and not some objective ordering standard
might be our final condition is perhaps the bitterest pill of all. I would be too idealistic (or
too lazy) not to address, at least briefly, some general questions about literature and
~-- - --- --- - -
criticism that might remain, like a strange aftertaste, after our specific lookat The Crying
ofLot 49. Where do we go from here? Are critics merely searchers who create their own
goal, fooling us into thinking there is meaning where there is none? Is literary
interpretation a contribution to the entropic decay ofknowledge and values in our
civilization? Are there any alternative epistemologies, any ways for us to live and work in
uncertainty, ifPynchon's two solutions, becoming inamorati or insane, are not feasible?
Pynchon himself at least returns to the question in Gravity's Rainbow, where
events ofthe larger reality meld with the quantum world. Describing "the tunnels down
here in the Mittlewerke, the narrator observes "bam-swallow squls, fashioned ofbrown
20
twilight, rise toward the white ceilings . . . they are unique to the Zone, they answer to the
new Uncertainty. Ghosts used to be either likenesses ofthe dead or wraiths ofthe living.
But here in the Zone categories have been blurred badly . . . Down here are only
wrappings left in the light, in the dark: images ofUncertaintyII (GR 303). Pynchon's
language itself IIblurs the categoriesII of light and dark, scientific and surreal, dream and
reality, even existence and oblivion. Later, discussing the possibility ofthe
Schwarzkommando's escape, Enzian speculates to Slothrop,
IIThere are even now powerful factions in Paris who don't believe we
exist. And most ofthe time I'm not so sure myself. II
IIHow's that?1I
IIWell, I think we're here, but only in a statistical way. Something like
that rock over there is just about 100% certain -- it knows it's there, so does
everybody else. But our own chances ofbeing right here right now are only a
little better than even -- the slightest shift in the probabilities and we're gone --
schapp! like that. II
IIPeculiar talk, Oberst. 1I (GR 361-62)
Pynchon here returns to the actualistic uncertainty he first explored in Lot 49, not only
positing it as the condition ofhis characters' existence, but translating its language directly
into the reader's experience with text and narrator.
John Mascaro suggests uncertainty's effect on the reader of Gravity's Rainbow,
arguing lithe novel's ultimate paradigm ofuncertainty, the reversal ofthe V2 rocket's
arrival and sound of approach, is 'actualized' on successive textuallevels ll (Mascaro
2007A). Our experience ofGraVity's Rainbow is the same that of The Crying ofLot 49,
though 600 pages longer. Conditioned by a lifetime of rational thinking, of looking for that
unifying message oftruth in the novel, we are bafl1ed by its incoherence, its
disconnectedness, its neologisms and esoterica, the lack ofplot momentum, the strangely
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artificial characters, the simultaneous presence of mutually exclusive realities. To claim
that a "systematic reading" is still possible with such a text seems too hopeful. Uncertainty
explodes beyond the realm of metaphor into hermeneutics and effects a fundamental
change in the way we view the study oftexts.
But what is the nature ofthis change? First, we must grant that Heisenberg and
Pynchon, in their distinct but related fields, have shown that the dichotomies of subject
and object, observer and observed, art and interpretation, are false ones. TJ. Reiss
addresses what the collapse ofthese dichotomies means in the broader arenas of discourse
and criticism. He notes that classically, "Truth -- objective truth -- was the function that
permitted the discourse ofthis episteme to operate" (Reiss 845). With the advent of
quantum theory and uncertainty, true came to mean the same thing as false and signs were
dislodged from their referents as if each individual subject was speaking a different
language. IIITruth' is no longer absolute meaning," Reiss says, "it is subsumed in some kind
of contextuality which can be 'defined' only by its practice" (Reiss 848). That is the root
problem uncertainty brings to discourse. What Reiss proposes to replace a discourse
where "truth" no longer holds is "the discourse of crisis." He isn't too clear what exactly
this new kind of discourse entails, but I take him to mean a criticism as process, an
academic version of the "actualistic fiction" Strehle describes, where activity, movement,
and play replace the grasp for the overriding meaning.
But as the good book says, there's nothing new under the sun. While things like
uncertainty, quantum theory, actualism and discourse of crisis seem so characteristic of
our intellectual predicament at the edge ofthe third millennium, ancient thinkers grappled
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with the same questions and the same difficulties of seeing ourselves in the universe. The
tradition ofJewish mysticism known as the Kabbalah proposed its own version of "the
discourse of crisis" over 1500 years ago in the form ofmidrash, an active engagement of .
the sacred text that is at once.interpretation, discovery, and creation. Like the uncertainty
principle, Kabbalah does not recognize the opposition between subjective interpretation
and object "truth." The interpreter ofthe Torah becomes an agent ofthe divinity, a
creator. Geoffery Hartman explains how midrash creates meaning from uncertainty: "By
confronting the undecidability oftextual meaning, this species of interpretation does not
paralyze itself Instead its own activity is absorbed into the activity of the text, producing a
continuum ofintertextual supplements, often in a spirit ofhigh-serious play" (Hartman xi).
Exactly like the examination of a subatomic system, midrash draws the subject and object
together, making the observer a participant in the phenomenon he observes. Even the
orthodox idea of a "sacred text" seems to dissolve into midrash itself, the sacred
interpretation in which each word is rewritten each time it is read.
Pynchon himself seems aware of quantum physics' mystical affinities in Gravity's
Rainbow. Organic chemists become "coal-tar Kabbalists" (GR 590) and the rocket
builders "Kabbalists who study the Rocket as Torah, letter by letter -- rivets, burner cup
and brass rose, ~ts text is theirs to permute and combine into new revelations, al~ays
unfolding" (GR 727). Dwight Eddins explains that the relationship of the scientists to the
rockets isthe same as that ofthe Kabbalists to the Torah: "To interpret it correctly is to
understand the purpose of existence, the goal toward which history moves. Like the
Torah, it both sets forth that goal and is that goal in its broadest meaning" (Eddins 139),
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that is, the interpretation itself creates meaning, since the Kabbalistic midrash, like
complementarity and actualistic fiction, opens itself to pluralistic rather than totalizing
meaning. Eddins believes that Pynchon invokes Kabbalistic tradition "in order to lend a
certain historical and religious resonance to these conspiracies" (Eddins 8), but as I
differed with Hume earlier, I think the Kabbalah is more than a flashy metaphor in
Gravitiy's Rainbow. I think Pynchon suggests that the Kabbalists' vision of reality is the
same as that ofmodem physicists, that one ofthe most recent ways of seeing ourselves in
the universe is also one ofthe most ancient, and that at t~e frontiers ofhuman knowledge
we return to its origin.
Joshua Wilner observes that the blurred distinction between art and interpretation,
subject and object, that we find in the Kabbalah, the uncertainty principle, and actualistic
fiction has indeed become a source of critical debate over the last twenty years:
On the one hand, there is a growing interest in the imaginative dimension of
exegesis: the freedom of its elaborations, the figurative texture of its own
language, its narrative modulations. On the other hand, there is a
complementary insistence on the exegetic power of literary texts: the ways in
which they "read" other texts, the ways in which they explicate themselves, the
ways in which they thematize and sustain reflection on questions of
hermeneutic theory. (Wilner 237)
There is a growing awareness ofthe interplay and interdependence of literature and
criticism everywhere. I have even discussed in this paper some ofthe latter trends Wilner
mentions as they manifest themselves in The Crying ofLot 49. Many critics such as
Derrida and his post-structural adherants have been asking and will continue to ask
themselves if truth is even desirable, if "objectivity" is not a constricting model. They have
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come to employ uncertainty in their work rather than combat it and, in midrashic fashion,
have come to see the search itself as the goal.
- -
Still, interesting ideas are almost always generated by their opposition. Formalists
like Alan Tate have urged that interpretation cannot be its own end, that literary criticism
"cannot reproduce itself, though ... it is capable oftrying. Its end is outside itself' (Tate
483). More recently Hayden White laments that the kind criticism I have discussed here,
which he calls "absurdist" or "reductivist" criticism, has "slipped its cultural moorings. II
"He believes "it does not know where to draw the line between 'literature' on one side and
'language' on the other" (White 261). White does not find this new situation liberating but
nihilistic: "there is no 'meaning,' only the ghostly ballet of alternative 'meanings' which
various modes offiguration provide. We are indentured to an endless series of
metaphorical translations from one universe of figuratively provided meaning to another.
And they are all equally figurative ... meaninglessness is embraced as a goal" (White
281-82).
White and others do not surrender to the uncertainty they read as cultural ~hilism.
They locate the origin ofthis critical movement not in quantum theory but in totalitarian
politics. The levelling ofobjective truth into subjective interpretation, lithe reductivist
mode ofcriticism, II White asserts, was an anti-elitist movement that IIarose concomitantly
with the overt politicization of criticism which the totalitarian regimes ofRussia,
Germany, and Italy promoted during the interwar years" (White 272). But for Derrida and
other post-structuralists, this·need not be a bad thing. Derrida, who evolved his own
linguistic brand ofuncertainty by denying the presence ofa "transcendental signified," or
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ultimate guarantor of truth, finds liberation in the free play of signifiers that this linguistic
. _l.!n~ert~llty ~!!.a~~e~ (Derrida 169). In this situation, denial of objective truth constitutes a
denial of authoritarian control, or a political "Logos" that would maintain power by
dictating the single "truth" to which all subjects would be compelled to conform. Even
Strehle hedges her bet somewhat, denying that The Crying ofLot 49 is a purely reflexive
exercise in metafiction. She detects, as White and Derrida might, a political thrust in
Pynchon's utilization ofthe Heisenberg principle: "These institutions [government,
corporation, finn, cartel] encourage and exploit popular beliefs in stability, continuity,
causality, objectivity, and certainty, because Newtonian beliefs make citizens and soldiers
more docile and more useful for institutional work" (Strehle 28). Pynchon's embracing of
opposing ideals in Lot 49 and other novels would represent then a clever form of
countercultural social protest. David Cowart corroborates, reading The Crying ofLot 49
as "a story ofconsciousness being raised -- an allegory of sixties America repudiating
conformity, racism, and militarism" (Cowart 189).
Ofcourse Pynchon and Heisenberg would agree with these criticisms and any
others we might venture. The beauty ofthe uncertainty principle is that it rejects and
accepts all viewpoints simultaneously. In a sense it is a perfectly conceived critical
posture. You can't argue with it because it anticipates your argument as intrinsic to itself
You can't corroborate it because to prove it would be to grasp at an objective truth and
this, we remember, is impossible.
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It's AU Greek to Me
paper since page one. Ifthe uncertainty principle claims that objective truth is
unattainable, how then are we to receive the "truth" that Heisenberg, Pynchon, and this
paper for that matter, put forth -- the truth that there is no truth? This is of course the
unanswerable paradox that even Nietzsche, in all his creativity, could not solve.
Responding to Heraclitus' famous dictum on the flux of life that "you can't step in the
same river twice, II Nietzsche replied (I paraphrase) that "you can't even step in the same
river once. II In other words, our human perceptions and language dupe us into believing
that our reality is any more real that ofthe quark, for whom time, space, movement,
permanence, and truth mean nothing. The only truth, Nietzsche scoffed, fully conscious of
the paradox, is that there is no truth. We can squabble here over terminology, definitions,
we can cite sources, devise convoluted arguments to answer this unanswerable paradox,
or we can let it stand in all its ironic beauty as logical loop incomprehensible to the human
mind, a conceptual mobius strip that is nothing more than a modern, less ornamented
version of the ancient puzzle one man posed languidly to another one sunny·
Mediterranean afternoon. All Cretans are liars. . . rm a Cretan . . . .
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Notes
1. Later, as quantum theory wormed itself into the popular consciousness, dozens
Q[booksemergedintegratingJhe--"New~J>hysks~_Ytith ~hl!!Heisenberg calls "these very
old trends ofthought" (Philosophy 187). Among them are Gary ZukaV'sThe Dancing Wu
Li Masters, Paul Davies' God and the New Physics, Robert Nadeau's Readingsfrom the
New Book ofNature and Susan Strehle's Fiction in the Quantum Universe. These latter
two bring postmodem fiction into the quantum realm.
2. The principle of complementarity was developed from a dispute between Bohr
and Heisenberg regarding the wave-particle duality of light. Complementarity, also called
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, is basically the uncertainty principle
evolved into a formal philosophical view. It attempts to reconcile the subjective and
sometimes mutually exclusive views ofatomic phenomena that result from uncertainty
simply by allowing for a multiplicity of descriptions, or "interpretations," of a subatomic
phenomenon.
3. As Bohr sighed to Heisenberg on a skiing holiday in the alpine heights of
Bavaria, "That is the whole paradox of quantum theory. On the one hand, we establish
laws that differ from classical physics; on the other, we apply the concepts ofclassical
physics quite unreservedly whenever we make observations" (Heisenberg, Beyond 129).
4. Arthur Eddington reflects on the quantum revolution: "We have found that
where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that
which the mind has put into nature. We have found a strange footprint on the shores ofthe
unknQwu.We have devised profound theories,.on after another, to account for its origin.
At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And Lo!
it is our own. (Heisenberg, Nature 153).
5. John Barth's "Lost in the Funhouse" meshes the story of a boy's adventure in a
funhouse with metafictional commentary on the various elements ofthe story. Barth's
deconstructive technique reminds the reader ofthe artificial and mutable reality ofthe text
while emphasizing the role the reader plays in the creation/interpretation ofthat reality.
Jorge Luis Borges' "Pierre Menard, Author ofthe Quixote" describes a man who
endeavors and partially.succeeds in rewriting, word fur word, Cervantes' masterpiece, not
from memory, but as his own original work. Borges also disrupts the neat boundary
betWeen reader and writer, interpreter and creator.
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Abstract
Ideas ofthe lIinfinitell found in the Jewish mystical tradition of the Kabbalah, Jorge
- -- -------
Luis Borges' short story, liThe Library ofBabel, II and the post-structuralist linguistic
philosophy of Jacques Derrida exhibit close parallels. Although Borges and Derrida
consciously distance their thought from the Kabbalah and perhaps lack the faith of the
medieval Jewish mystics, they employ a Kabbalistic hermeneutic and reach analogous
conclusions about human knowing -- the apprehension, or attempted apprehension of
something like the divine through the structure oftextuality. While the mystical,
metaphoric, and linguistic terms ofthe Kabbalah, Borges, and Derrida respectively differ,
they share the same epistemological approach grounded in three general ideas: text and
linguistic structure as the fundamental structure of all reality, man's ability to create infinite
IImeaningsll through an active engagement, manipulation, or play within this structure, and
finally, an absolute absence or lIunknowable irifinityll at the heart ofthis structure which by
its very non-identity enables this creation and play. Despite these parallels, each assumes a
moral stance toward the lIinfinite. II That which the Kabbalah regards as divine, Borges sees
as hopeless and Derrida as IIjoyoUS. II These differing attitudes can be attributed to the
various political or religious context within which the Kabbalah, Borges and Derrida
understand infinity.
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Trapping God in the Labyrinth:
The Kabbalah, Borges, Derrida and the "Infinite"
Moses said to God, "IfI go to the Israelites and tell them that
the God oftheir forefathers has sent me to them, and they ask
me his name, what shall I say?" And then God answered,
"1 AM, that is who I am. "
Exodus 3: 13-14
In Buenos Aires, a boy retreats to his father's library. Shutting out the calm
Argentine summer and the shouts in the street, he escapes into a universe ofepic and
magic. Though he would never admit it to his father, the outside makes him uneasy. He
feels more at home here among elegant languages, mysterious symbols, and the yellowing
leaves ofhis father's most prized volumes. But he retreats more in fascination than in fear.
In the library, in his universe, there is more pleasure and dread than outsiders can imagine.
Today, in an effort to learn German, he returns to Gustav Meyrink's The Golem, a tale of
a Prague rabbi who fashions a creature out ofmud and invests it with mystical life. Some
years later in Algeria, as the panther tanks roll across the continent, another boy has a less
leisurely experience of German. In his own streets, he endures racial derision he does not
fully understand. He notices threatening graffiti on the walls and cautiously evades
potentially violent encounters with soldiers and other boys. At home he listens to his
father, a scholar, speak of something terrible happening in Europe, ofghettos and
"cleansing laws." He makes his own retreat into seductive literature -- Nietzsche, .
Rousseau, and Gide -- not because they offer an escape from the mundane, but because
they offer an explanation ofthe chaos.
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Eventually, a childhood passion for books would evolve into complex linguistic
. ancl~pi~t~moIQgi~aLth.e_oti~ ~~_~h~ two bo~s~ould be known internationally as
"Borges" and "Derrida. II Their adult thinking would also be shaped in part by also their
Judaic roots. Derrida, coming from a long line ofAlgerian rabbis, became painfully
conscious ofhis heritage during adolescent experience ofthe Nazis in North Africa.
Borges, raised Catholic, never forgot that his family name, Acevedo, figures in the list of
those descending from Galician shephardic roots (Borges, Reader 65). In their work, both
attempt to reconcile received Judaic tradition with individual beliefs and aesthetic
practices. But these elements remain somewhat latent. Although Derrida pays substantial
lipservice to the Judaic, its status is ultimately secondary in his thinking. Edna Aizenberg
explains that "despite his allusions to the Torah and to the Jew as the autochthon ofthe
Book, Derrida is seen as developing his views from a critique of Saussurian linguistics . . .
rather than from Rabbi Akiva or Isaac Luria" (Aizenberg, Aleph 258). Similarly, Borges
.admits to the prominence in his work of10 hebreo, the Judaic, but his interest in 10 hebreo
is more as a metaphor for Latin American culture, lithe deep involvement with Europe
coupled with a sense ofotherness vis-a.,.vis the Continent and the western order it
represents" (ibid). Borges, like Derrida, partially disavows his Hebraic legacy. In his essay,
IIA Vindication ofthe Kabbalah, It Borges himself confesses an ignorance ofthe Hebrew
language and claims that "I do not wish to vindicate the doctrine, but rather the
hermeneutical or cryptographic procedures which lead to it" (Borges, Reader 22). But the
Judaic influence in Borges and Derrida is perhaps not so latent as Aizenberg and Borges
himselfbelieve. Curiously, these Kabbalistic IIprocedures II lead both Borges and Derrida to
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conclusions about reality and language strikingly similar to the doctrine ofthe Kabbalah.
and why Borges' final attitude to "the infinite" is despair while Derrida's is joy.
Although Borges and Derrida consciously distance their thought from the
Kabbalah and perhaps lack the faith ofthe medieval Jewish mystics, they employ their
same Kabbalistic hermeneutic and reach, arguably, the same conclusions about human
knowing -- the apprehension, or attempted apprehension, ofthe divine, or something like
the divine, through the structure oftextuality. While the mystical, metaphoric, and
linguistic terms ofthe Kabbalah, Borges, and Derrida respectively differ, they share the
,
same hermeneutic approach grounded in three general ideas: text and linguistic structure
as the fundamental structure of all reality; man's ability to create infinite "meanings"
through an active engagement, manipulation, or play within this structure, and finally, an
absolute absence or "unknowable" at the heart ofthis structure which by its very
non-identity enables this creation and play.
The texts where we can best see the mystical affinities ofthese two postmodern
thinkers are selections from Derrida's OfGrammatology and Writing and Difference,
critiques of Saussurian structuralism, and Borges' "The Library ofBabel,I' a piece of
philosophy-fiction describing an infinite, labyrinthine library as a metaphor for the
structure ofa reality. Each ofthese texts, like the Kabbalah, expounds an epistemology
based on textual structure.
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SeIer Yetsirah
Oovio\isly, ali entire tradition of mysticism requiresmuch-more than:simply-a - -
cursory explanation. However, I only wish to outline briefly those tenets ofthe Kabbalah
.
that are most relevant to our understanding ofBorges and Derrida. Most generally, the
Kabbalah is the school ofJewish mysticism that grew from the contemplation ofthe Sefer
Yetsirah, or Book ofCreation, written sometime between the 3rd and 6th centuries. This
seminal Kabbalah treatise briefly discusses a cosmology based the ten elementary numbers,
./
,I ,I
or Sefiroth, and the twenty-two letters ofthe Hebrew alphabet:-The Sefiroth represent the
ten ways God manifests himself in creation, and the twenty-two letters the elements he
used to build creation. The orthographic characters holds a fundamental importance in the
doctrine ofthe Kabbalah because IItogether these represent the mysterious forces whose
convergence has produced the various combinations observable throughout the whole of
creation; they are the thirty-two secret paths ofwisdom, through which God has created
all that exists ll (Alazraki 15). This idea ofcreation through textual manipulation became
the key principle ofthe midrash and the basis ofthe medieval Kabbalists' rebellion against
Jewish orthodoxy, whose rigid doctrines, Aizenberg points out, IIseemed to them
unsatisfactory for penetrating the riddles of existence. Instead, the Kabbalists sought to
approach these riddles by reembracing mythopoetics ll (Aizenberg, Aleph 87).
The Sefer Yetsirah established that the fabric ofall creation is textual, that the
twenty-two orthographic characters ofthe Torah preceded the world, and that God
created· the world through the various and infinite combinations ofthese characters. The
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text is the Kabbalistic paradigm for the structure of reality. In his Major Trends in Jewish
Mysticism, qer~~om S~~lell1 ~~~lains that the Kabbalists saw the universe as "The
Absolute Book." For them, Holy Writ was the origin ofall meaning, the "cosmic law of
the Universe, as God's wisdom conceived it ... equivalent to the structure ... ofthis
world and ofthe world to come" (Scholem 14). All creation, all meaning, proceeds or
"emanates" from the orthographic characters ofthe Torah because "for the Kabbalists, the
letters ofthe Torah are the mystical body of God" (Alazraki 18). For the structuralist
theorist, a familiar idea emerges from the ancient Kabbalah·-- a reality created through the
structure of language.
Hebraic tradition refers to the divine act of creation, the cryptographic
arrangement and rearrangement ofthe twenty-two letters ofthe Sacred Writ, as the
midrash. Book II, chapter 2 ofthe Sefer Yetsirah reads "Twenty-two letter-elements: He
outlined them, hewed them out, weighed them, combined them, and exchanged them, and
through them created the soul of all creation and everything else that was ever created"
(Alazraki 45). Everything is created and made possible through this divine ars
combinatoria. A central axiom ofthe Kabbalah holds that man may also participate in the
midrash and create in the same manner as God since the lower world, our world, is
governed by the same law as the upper world, the divine. The law is the arrangement of
the letters ofthe Sacred Writ. However, while the midrash opens to man the potential for
God-like creation, it does not transform him into God. The arrangement ofthe letters that
enables creation is secret to all but God. Every word ofthe Torah has, as Borges says,
"six hundred thousand faces--that is, layers ofmeaning or entrances" (Christ 162). It is
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through the active engagement of these meanings, ofthe structure ofthe text, that the
Kabbalist finds IInot a meaning or the meaning, but rather meaning-as-process: the
ongoing search for significance through consideration and deciphermentII (Aizenberg,
-<
IIHebraism,1I 251). The midrash is the methodology ofthe Kabbalist, the commentary or
interpretation on the Torah which is itself an act of creation. At its roots, Kabbalistic
tradition does not recognize the profane dichotomy between literature and criticism, the
same dichotomy which has become troubled in post-structural writing and especially in
Borges and Derrida.
Another aspect of the Kabbalah instrumental to our understanding ofBorges and
Derrida is the En-so! The En-sqf, loosely translated as lithe infinite, II is related to the ten
Sefiroth, or numerical manifestations of God in the world. The Sefer Yetsirah holds that
there!U"e two worlds that represent God. The secondary world consists ofthe ten primary
numbers through which God manifests himself The primary world, the En-so/, is lithe
most deeply hidden of all, which remains insensible and unintelligible to all but Godll
(Alazraki 17). For the Kabbalists, this primary manifestation ofGod, more an unknowable
absence than a manifestation, lies at the heart ofthe creation-text. It is, as Aizenberg
explains, the llhidden Source, the primordial Point that sustains all points, all creationII
(Aizenberg, Aleph 87). Yet to describe the En-sofin this language, to call it a II Source, II a
IIprimordial Point, II or even an IIabsence, II is inaccurate because the En-so! is by definition
that which eludes language, and therefore that which eludes reality. The En-sofis best
expressed by an absence of language, yet by its very absence it lies at the heart of language
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and enables the existence of language and of reality. Borges elaborates on this
metaphysical paradox in his essay, "The Kabbalah ll :
Its [the Kabbalah's] core is the En-sof, the name used for the Godhead ... This
Godhead challenges definition, very much like the Buddhist Nirvana. We begin,
therefore, with an indeterminable divinity to whom we cannot ascribe any attribute
... This divinity rejects any affirmation; we cannot say that the En-sofis or was or
will be, because this will amount to limiting him. The condition of being
corresponds to our human world, and the divine nature ought to be different ...
The En-sofrejects any qualifier, even a .metaphoric one ... The Godhead is
impervious to words and cannot create anything, because the act ofcreation
reduces him to a human i.ntelligence . . . The God ofthe Kabbalists created the
world by his absence ... God has abandoned us, but we continue living as
creatures of his dream. (Borges, "Kabbalah ll 59-61)
The En-so,f, God, is ultimately defined as an absence, but it is his absence that is his
creation. The Kabbalists' mystical notion of divinity as absence will figure interestingly into
Derrida's idea of the primordial non-identity that creates all subsequent identity through
difjeral1C;e,aDdfl19re irorllc~lly_i~o _~e!~eg_gerian Dasein, the "open space" that allows
entities to reveal themselves, from which Derrida paItially evolved his own idea of
absence.
Already some peculiar parallels between medieval Jewish mysticism and
post-structural linguistics have become apparent. It remains to explore how these
Kabbalistic influences manifest themselves in the texts ofBorges and Derrida. Although,
as I will discuss later, each adopts his own brand of the Kabbalists' essential religious
"faith," both Borges and Derrida. espouse the their idea of reality as text and their
rnidrashic methodology of actively engaging the reality-text, the Holy Writ, not in search
ofmeaning in the conventional sense, but "meaning-as-process, II where the play of
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signifiers is itself the goal. The En-sof, the concept of God as the "creative" absence at
the heart ofthe Holy Text, will be reincarnated as the Derridean non-identit)ror abyss at
-- . ----- ._---- - -. - - - -
the source of linguistic structure and as the abyss or chaos at the center ofBorges'
labyrinthine library.
Torah
Borges' infinite Library ofBabel is a metaphor for the textual structure ofthe
universe as he parenthetically states in the story's initial sentence: "The universe (which
others call the Library) is composed of an indefinite and perhaps infinite number of
hexagonal galleries" (Borges, Labyrinths 51). The writing contained in the library's infinite
number ofbooks is explicitly given as a metaphor for the linguistic nature of reality. Man
is represented as "the imperfect librarian" and "the universe, with its elegant,endowment of
shelves, ofenigmatical volumes ... [as] the work ofa god" (Borges, Labyrinths 52). The
Kabbalistic-idea-of the universe as thewrlting_ofQoet is evid~l1t her~. So~e ~peculate that
it wa~ the Kabbalists' deification ofwriting that attracted Borges to their hermeneutic, that
it seemed to in some way justify his life's work. Aizenberg argues that "Borges, no longer
able to believe in the Kabbalists' God, nonetheless recognizes that their sacralization of the
letter played an essential role in granting his task an honored place -- perhaps the most
honored place -- in the human creative order" (Aizenberg, Aleph 94). But a tension
...
develops in Borges' writing that results from his attempt to "sacralize" the letter without
an accompanying belief in the divine, a tension that, as we will see, emerges in "The
Library ofBabel" as sense ofweariness and despair.
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Although Derrida's task in Writing and Difference is the deconstruction of
Saussurian structuralism, he is nevertheless bound to its most basic notion of a
linguistically determined reality. He admits, "we can pronounce not a single destructive
proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and t~e implicit
postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest" (Derrida, Writing 280), that is, we
cannot deconstruct structuralism unless we first accept its linguistic premises. Derrida, in
Kabbalistic-deconstructive fashion, decenters Saussurian structure in "Structure, Sign.; and
Play, II by replacing its ordering "presence" of a transcendental signified with absence, but
throughout his critique maintains the basic Saussurian concepts: arbitrariness of signifiers,
relational identity, and finally, the linguistic construction of reality. This fundamental
structuralist supposition, though divorced oftheological overtones, parallels the
Kabbalists' belief that all creation issues from the Torah, or the sacred text. For Derrida
and the Kabbalists alike, the famous dictum holds -- "there is nothing outside the text, II
- ~ .~--_._-~
though post-structuralists do not privilege any single text as "sacred."
In her essay, "Hebraism and Literary Theory," Aizenberg traces primacy ofwriting
in Derrida to a Hebraic tradition which, unlike the Hellenic tradition, held that writing
ranked higher than speech in the hierarchy of representational constructs (Aizenberg,
"Hebraism" 252). An integral component of the Hebraic tradition manifest in both Borges
and Derrida is creative absence, rather than creative presence, as the source of reality. In
Derrida, language itself operates through this absence of a transcendental signified,
conveying meaning not absolute and totalizing, but dynamic and fluid. Derrida reminds us
that it was Nietzsche who first proposed the "entire thematics of active interpretations,
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which substitutes an incessant deciphering for the disclosure oftruth as the presentation of
the thing itself' (Derrida, Grammatology xxiii). An ironic parallel develops between
- - - ~-- ---~~
Hebraic tradition and the nihilistic philosophy that in this century attempted to eradicate
that tradition from past and future history. It was Nietzsche and Heidegger, arguably two
intellectual contributors to Nazi philosophy, who first adopted the ideas ofa primordial
absence and decentered "truth," ideas, as we have seen, originally born ofJewish
mysticism.
Midrash
.The "active interpretations" or "incessant deciphering" that Derrida sees as the
thematic ofwriting is also the thematic of the midrash. The midrash does not conceive of
meailing via interpretation but of meamng as interpretation itself, as "meaning-as-process."
According to the Kabbalah, the function ofa text is not to convey a single meaning
accessible through interpretation, but to enable as m,my interpretations as possible, to hold
within itself the infinite myriad of creation, of eternal possibilities, the "six hundred
thousand" faces of every word. In "Force and Signification," Derrida characterizes writing
in similar fashion, describing it not as the shallow and simple disclosure of the thing itself,
of a single interpretation, but as a kind of relief or photographic negative ofthe
conventional hermeneutic approach:
The necessarily restricted passageway of speech against which all possible
meanings push each other, preventing each other's emergence. Preventing, but
calling upon each other, provoking each other too, unforeseeably and as if despite
oneself, in a kind of autonomous overassemblage ofmeanings, a power ofpure
equivocality that makes the creativity of the classical God appear all to poor.
(Derrida, Writing 9)
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For Derrida and for the Kabbalists, a text, the simplest word, holds within it all possible
worlds. Though limited historically by social convention, every symbol, every signifier,
because of its arbitrary relation to its signifieds, has the potential to take on any ofan
infinite number of meanings. Writing, commentary, interpretation, play, midrash, are for
Derrida analogous to divine action; for the Kabbalists, they are divine action. The
Kabbalists would probably also argue that even this distinction -- analogy and actuality --
is a false one, since the law which governs the upper world also governs the lower world.
Midrash, recombination of textual elements, interpretation, whatever one c~ooses to call
it, far from being muddled by an infinite multiplicity of interpretations, revels in it, since
every interpretation is a means to apprehend the divine. In Derridean terms, writing is a
way not of coming to know God, but rather the absence of an ultimate logos or guarantor
ofmeaning, which becomes increasingly similar to the God of the Kabbalists. The only
uncertainty, to_which we will return later, is the element ofbeliefor purpose in midrash
and free play.
In "The Library ofBabel," Borges utterly dissolves the distinction between text
and interpretation into the midrash. The librarian narrator explains that library's volumes
contain "all variations permitted by the twenty-five orthographical symbols ... I cannot
combine some characters which the divine Library has not foreseen" (Borges, Labyrinths
57). Then, in a moment of self-aware irony, he observes, "this wordy and useless epistle
already exists in one ofthe thirty volumes ofthe five shelves of one ofthe innumerable
hexagons -- and its refutation as well" (ibid.). Since all has already been written in the
library, all combinations ofthe twenty-two letters ofthe Torah already conceived and
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inscribed by God, any writing we engage in is nothing but midrash or reco~bination ofa
combination of letters that already has a place in the lIdivine Libraryll ofcreation.
Oppositions ofliterature and criticism are instantly effaced in liThe Library ofBabelII and
in many other ofBorges' fiction-criticisms. Borges' piece is simultaneously a gothic tale of
a weary man lost in mind-bending architecture and a critical essay on the linguistic
structure of reality. If this collapse ofhermeneutic oppositions is a defining characteristic
ofBorgesian and perhaps other post-structuralist writing, it has its parallel or root in the
Kabbalah. In Criticism in the Wilderness, Geoffery Hartman observes the IIJudaic
contaminationII in contemporary criticism, the midrashic trend of collapsing the opposition
between "primary text" and "commentaryll as Kabbalists employed the Torah and its
"
exegeses interchangeably in their divine art (Hartman 206).
The idea is the same here as in Derrida and the Kabbalah. Meaning is not
apprehended through the act of interpretation, but in the act of interpretation itself, of
playing with the infinite combinations and arrangements of signifiers, of constantly
resignifying reality, of engaging the creation-text in godlike midrash. But Borges' piece
seems to differ with Derrida and the Kabbalah in a significant regard, the attitude assumed
toward the midrash, toward the situation ofexisting in a linguistic reality in which all
possible worlds have already been conceived, either in the mind of God or in Derrida's
lIautonomous overassemblage of meanings." The task ofBorges' librarian is essentially
midrash or Derridean play. The epigraph is a definition ofthe midrash from a Kabbalistic
text C'Twenty-two letters he combined them ...") and the number ofletters that in their
infinite combinations constitute the library's volumes is the same as the number ofletters in
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the Hebrew alphabet -- 22 characters, the space, the comma, and the period. Yet the
librarian, unlike the Kabbalist, sees his task as fatalistic and absurd. He describes his
existence and that of the library's populace as a depressed and directionless perusal ofthe
infinite volumes in search ofthe IIVindications: books ofapology and prophecy which
vindicated for all time the acts of every man in the universe . . . a clarification of
humanity's basic mysteries -- the origin ofthe Library and oftime" (Borges, Labyrinths
55). Other cult groups, rather than wasting energy climbing stairs and turning pages,
juggle the twenty-two letters in a dice cup, hoping that this "feeble mimicry" ofthe divine
ars combinatoria will reveal to them the "infamous words". Although the narrator
mentions a briefperiod of IIextravagant happiness" when the existence ofthe Vindications
was postulated, he later tells us that happiness turned to "excessive depression" when the
hope in ever finding them was finally accepted as futile. He mentions passingly the
increasing frequency of suicides among the librarians.
So why this weariness in Borges with the "incessant deciphering" Derrida
experiences as liberating and the Kabbalists associate with the divine? We can view this as
merely a fictional affectation ofthe narrator, but this weariness seems to reach deeper into
Borges' thought. Perhaps a clue may lie in our understanding ofBorges and Derrida as
writers who employ Kabbalistic methods without the Kabbalists' faith, in their attempt to
translate a mystic or theological methodology into profane or atheistic terms. Perhaps we
can infer from Borges' depressed tone in liThe Library ofBabeI;' that this translation is a
partial failure, that the Kabbalists' faith in God was an essential element in their intimation
of the creation-text, that attempting to employ Kabbalistic cryptography divorced from
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faith results in a paralyzing sense of futility. The Kabbalists themselves would argue that
midrash with improper intentions results in the scholar's destruction in the face ofthe
infinite, like the librarians who throw themselves into the library's abysmal air shafts.
Does this indicate that faith in a divinity is crucial to an affirmative assessment of
the linguistic structure of reality" It does not seem so with Derrida who, hardly considered
a religious thinker, associates the free play of signifiers with
the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation ofthe play ofthe world
and ofthe innocence ofbecoming, the affirmation ofthe world of signs.without
fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation.
This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as the loss of
center. (Derrida, Writing 292)
Derrida claims a certain joy in this play similar to the Kabbalists' joy in the midrash and
yet, like Borges, without an explicit faith. Does Derrida make a virtue ofnecessity? Can
free play can truly be joyous and liberating if one has no other choice than to accept and
exist in a "world of signs ... without truth and without origin?" Is joy in the "noncenter"
simply a necessary self-delusion akin to an ath,eist's own assessment of religious faith? Or
is Derrida's conclusion potentially theological? Is his joyous participation in the
"autonomous overassemblage of meanings" akin to a belief in the divine? We will return to
these questions concerning attitude and belief later, but now Derrida's "loss of center"
carries us forward.
En-so!
Derrida directly relates the joy ofplay with the determination ofthe noncenter of
the structure of signifiers. He draws this relation from his earlier critique of Saussure's
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mistaken idea ofthe presence of a transcendental signifier at the center of linguistic
structurality:
structure -- or rather the structurality of structure -- has always been neutralized or
reduced, and this by a process ofgiving it a center or of referring it to a point of
presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was not only to orient, balance
and organize the structure . . . but above all to make sure that the organizing
principle ofthe structure would limit what we might call the play ofthe structure.
(Derrida, Writing 278)
Derrida argues that the illusion of a transcendental signified at the center ofSaussurian
structuralism arose for much the same reason as the Cartesian "Cogito", the logos, and the
conventional (non-Kabbalistc) conception of God, and "the determination ofBeing as
presence in all senses of this word" (Derrida, Writing 279). In OfGrammatology, he
further defines this creative absence at the heart of the reality-text, or differance, in
paradoxical terms not unlike those in which Borges attempts to describe the En-so/in
"The Kabbalah":
Does it [writing] not renounce the present and proper in order to master them
better in their meaning, in the ideal form oftruth . . . This means that differance
makes the opposition of presence and absence possible . . . Differance produces
what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible ...
differance is recognized as the obliterated origin of absence and presence.
(Derrida, Grammatology 143).
According to Derrida, the Appollonian or Saussurian view ofstructure fears that
the unrestricted play differance and the absence of a "fixed origin" to which all signifiers
ultimately refer results in nihilism. Derrida, in substituting differance for the
transcendental signified as the creator of meaning, claims this "nihilism" is both desirable
and inevitable. It is precisely this imposition ofthe false center that closes offthe kind of
play between signifiers and relati.onal identities that Saussurian structuralism claims to
45

En-sof, the Kabbalists· conception ofthe Godhead who, as Borges says, "created the
world by his absence. II By p~~iting a~ absence at!~ cent~r ~f~h~stfIJcture o~ignifte~s, ~
non-identity that in tum creates all identity, even Being itself, Derrida deconstructs
structuralism and in the process Kabbalizes it. For the Kabbalists also posited God, the
En-sof, the creative source of the universe, as the unknowable absence at the heart ofthe
Holy Text. For the Kabbalists also, God was the primordial non-identity, since identity,
even as "eternal" or IIomnipotent, II would entail humanity. As the absence ofa
transcendental signified enables play and differance, the En-so/enables the midrash, the
continuous reinterpretation and recombination ofthe letters, and transforms the
commentary on the Sacred Writ into creation itself Like "the nonIocus in which an infinite
number of sign-substitutions came into play, II the En-so/, God as "the absolute hidden
source" of the creation-text unapprehendable through language, validates the infinite
combinations of the midrash. The infinity ofthe potential combinations ofmidrash reflect
the infinity of the En-so/itself Though Derrida does not express his linguistic theory in
mystical terms, but rather as IIdifferance," "play," and IIabsence, " the idea of an unfixed
linguistic reality issuing from primordial non-being remains.
In "The Library ofBabel," the linguistic labyrinth is structured as a perfectly
symmetrical network ofhexagonal galleries, but because the geometric labyrinth is infinite,
the center of its symmetry is a non-locus, as Borges illustrates in another piece, liThe
Fearful Sphere ofPascal. " He quotes Giordano Bruno, a renaissance astron<;>mer, who,
trying to comprehend the form of the universe, obselved, IIIWe can assert with certitude
that the universe is all center, or that the center ofthe universe is everywhere and the
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circumference is nowhere'll (Borges, Labyrinths 191). This paradoxical formulation,
Borge~not~_Lecursthroug!I()ut the intellectual history of mankind as he has attempted to
.~---- - -- ---- -- - - --
articulate the infinity of God or the universe in his inadequate languages. This is perhaps
the reason Borges has made Pascal's Sphere the structure of his own linguistic universe.
The infinite library has as its center, like Derrida's noncentered structure, an infinite
number of loci, or rather none, since to our human consciousness, both are forms ofthe
infinite. The labyrinthine library is simultaneously an expression oforder and chaos, of
architecture and abyss. Gutierrez-:Mouat believes Borges lIerects a frame of reference that
is self-consciously literary and in which it is possible to show an absence, to articulate a
silence II (Gutierrez-Mouat 292).
The narrator tells us of divine absence in the library who he refers to as liThe Man
ofthe Bookll : IIWe also know of another superstition ofthat time: that of IThe Man ofthe
Book.' On some shelf in some hexagon (men reasoned) there must exist a book which is
the formula and perfect compendium ofall the rest: some librarian has gone through it and
he is analogous to a godll (Borges, Labyrinths 56). The librarian himself reasons that
somewhere in the library there exists liThe Bookll which is the key to all other books, a
Saussurian llfixed origin II which would orient and give sense and center to all the other
books and to the library itself Still, as Derrida's idea of absence, the En-sof, and Pascal's
Sphere all tell us in their distinct fashions, when one confronts the infinite, somewhere is
also nowhere. The chances of actually locating The Book, or any specifically desired
book, IIcan be computed as zero ... Obviously, no one expects to discover anything II
(Borges, Labyrinths 55). The Book, or center, is thus perceived by the librarians as the
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Kabbalists perceived the En-soj, as a God who by his very absence creates the universe,
the unknowable center of the linguistic labyrinth.
-_._----
Again, it is this absolute absence, or Borgesian En-so/, at the heart of the
labyrinthls structure which compels the midrashic engagement ofthe text. In his brief
comment on the piece, Bamatan likens the librariansl task to Kabbalistic midrash: lithe
search for a book that makes sense of all the other innumerable books that comprise the
library can symbolize the search for the name, for the formula that the Kabbalists sought in
order to accelerate the advent of the messianic age" (Bamatan 56). But we must
remember that the search was fundamentally midrashic "meaning-as-process," that
meaning was perceived in the search itself and "no one expects discover anything. II liThe
fallacious center, 'I Gutierrez-Mouat observes, "operates at the level ... in which a futile
search is undertaken for The Book ofBooks" (Gutierrez-Mouat 288). Yet, as the En-so!
compels the inidrash·and the absence ora transcendental signified-corn:pelsthe infinite play
of signifiers, the search for The Book is compelled by its own futility: "There is no
revelation [in Borges' fiction], only the immanence of one which, of course, is Borges'
tentative definition ofthe aesthetic phenomena" (ibid.).
For their respective ideas of a creative absence, Borges and Derrida might be
partially indebted to Heidegger, who proposed a vacuum-like "open space, II or Dasein, as
the primordial non-being that enables all being to reveal itself Heidegger then, a Nazi,
may have evolved his phenomenology on the same premises as the Judaic tradition he
thought a corrupting influence, since the Kabbalistic notion of primordial non-identity or
49
non-being, also the basis ofDerridean linguistics and Borgesian labyrinths, is suspiciously
expressed by Heidegger's notion ofDasein. Michael Zimmerman explains:
Heidegger defined "being" in a different way than most other philosophers.
Traditionally, philosophers have defined the "being" of an entity as its ground
or substance, that which provides the "foundation" for the thing ... Heidegger
argued that for something lito be" means for it to disclose or present itself For
this presencing (Anwesen) or self-manifesting to occur, there must be a clearing, an
opening, an emptiness, a nothingness, and absencing (Abwesen) ... Dasein means
the place in which being occurs, the openness in which presencing transpires.
(Zimmerman 243-44)
As rector ofthe University ofFreiberg in 1933 and 1934, Heidegger vocally espoused the
anti-semitic party line of the National Socialism, turned over Jewish colleagues to the
Gestapo, denied financial aid to Jewish and other IInon-Aryan II students, and believed so
firmly in Hitler that he once declared to a student assembly, lithe Fuhrer himselfand he
alone is German reality and its law, today and for the future" (Sheehan 86). One has to
wonder ifHeidegger would have reacted had he seen the parallel between Judaic
mysticism and his own philosophy.·
But are they really parallel? Heidegger claims that primordial non-being or absence
not only precedes being, but creates or enables being itself With the "open space II of
Dasein, Heidegger makes an apparent case for non-centered reality, but re~ity as he
envisions it is indeed centered around the Fuhrer, or Fuhrer-principle, "German reality
and its law today and for the future. II Sheehan explains that Heidegger IIsaw Nazism asa
vehicle for realizing the ultra conservative vision of one ofhis favorite political theorists,
Friedrich Naumann ... that of a strong nationalism ... under the guidance of a
charismatic leader" (Sheehan 86). In Heidegger and "the jews", Lyotard wonders if
indeed all ofHeideggerian phenomenology is not essentially "a very sophisticated and
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radical form ofNazism" (Lyotard xvi). So although the irony is alluring, although it might
appear that a Nazi's philosophy is informed by the faith of a Jew, we must nevertheless
suspect that Heidegger's real commitment to his own idea ofprimordial non-being is
subordinate to his totalizing view of the Fuhrer-principle. In short, the comparison of
Dasein with Kabbalistic En-so! is troubled by Heidegger's totalizing political philosophy.
Adona; Elohenu
Derrida himself does not fail to see the interdependence ofpolitical power and
language, an interdependence that returns us now to the unanswered question: is the
Kabbalists' faith a necessary element in the ecstatic implementation oftheir cryptography?
Can Borges' and Derrida's conception of absence at the center ofthe linguistic structure be
equated with the Kabbalists' mystical faith in the En-so/, the God as absence? Ifwe accept
that the search in Borges' fiction is motivated by its own futility, then we must conclude
that in all three texts, the Kabbalah, Derrida's post-structuralism, and Borges'
fiction-criticism, the engagement, interpretation, or play ofthe structure, is opened and
compelled by the same fundamental concept of absolute absence at its center. Are all
three, in fact, forms of "faith"? For the Kabbalists, the absence takes the form ofthe
En-so!which validates the infinite combinations ofmidrash; for Derrida, it takes the form
ofthe absent transcendental signified, the primordial non-identity which opens up
differance and infinite play of signifiers; and for Borges it is The Book, which, though
eternally lost in the somewhere-nowhere of the infinite library, holds the key to the infinite
volumes.
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We might be tempted to conclude simply that Derrida and Borges only think they
are atheists, that their elaborate linguistic theories are only more modem expressions of
"faith," and that "the. autonomous overassemblage ofmeanings" and "The Man ofthe
Book" are only more unconventional signifiers of the divine. Derrida himself, often read as
opposed to a "totalization" like religious faith, admits, "what I should be tempted to
denounce as a lure -- i.e., totalization or gathering up -- isn't this what keeps me going"
(Derrida, Acts 34). Yet, while these conclusions might be partially true and the parallels
between post-structuralism and the Kabbalah are striking enough, questions, remain
regarding Borges' and Derrida's differing attitudes toward the "creation-text" and the
infinite absence that enables its existence. Why, if they both grasp for the divine, does one
express an almost suicidal weariness and the other claim an affirming joy?
Before we can answer this, before we can understand post-structural linguistics in>'
terms of mystical faith, we must first understand the nature ofthe Kabbalists' faith, the
Judaic tradition, and Derrida and Borges' relative views of that tradition. Derrida recalls
Hegel's story ofPompey's attempt to understand the conquered Jews:
Curious to know what was behind the doors ofthe tabernacle that housed the
holy ofholies, the triumvir approached the innermost part of the Temple, the
center ofworship. There, says Hegel, he sought 'a being, an essence offered to
his meditation, something meaningful to command his respect; and when he
thought he was entering into the secret, before the ultimate spectacle, he felt
mystified, disappointed, deceived. He found what he sought in an 'empty space'
and concluded from this that the genuine secret was itselfentirely extraneous to
them, the Jews; it was unseen and unfelt.' (Derrida, Acts 208)
From a Kabbalistic point ofview, the story reflects a vain and ignorant attempt to know
the unknowable En-so/, but it could also serve as a parable of otherness, ofan outsider's
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attempt to interpret "the Jews." Could we compare Borges and Derrida's attempt to
reconcile Judaic tradition with post-structuralism to Pompey's visit to the Holy ofHolies?
Although both were heirs to a Judaic heritage and technically not outsiders, both
experienced a certain alienation from this heritage. Borges' shephardic ancestors gradually
assimilated to Spanish Catholicism and his Judaic heritage became latent. He reflects, "my
Judaism, like the songs of Mendelssohn, is without words ... Two hundred years without
being able to discover the Israelite, 200 years without managing to set my hands on this
ancestor" (Borges, Reader 65). Derrida, who was faced with a more immediate threat,
saw his Judaism in the context of racial and political struggle. He remembers his own
adolescence in Nazi-occupied Algeria: "Racism was everywhere in Algeria ~t the time ...
Being Jewish and a victim of anti-semitism didn't spare one the anti-Arab racism I felt
everywhere around me, in manifest or latent form" (Derrida, Acts 39).
We might understand Borges and Derrida's distinct attitudes toward the
creation-text in terms oftheir respective experiences ofJudaism and political power. As
we have seen, both reach conclusions about reality and language that parallel Kabbalistic
tradition. Both attempt to divorce its faith or "doctrine" from its methodology. We have
noted that Borges' librarian, like Pompey, "felt mystified, disappointed, deceived" in his
search for a divinity he found ultimately to be "an empty space" while Derrida instantly
concludes that there is a joy and liberation to this centerless nihilism. How does Derrida
succeed in divorcing mysticism from faith where Borges fails? What is the nature ofthis
"liberation"? Has Derrida really ceased to believe or does he replace belief in the divine
with another form of "totalization" to "keep himselfgoing"?
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The liberation could be understood through the interdependence of language and
politics that Derrida demonstrates throughout OfGrammatology:
~-----
Linguistic play prevents totalitarian control: "Deterioration in the language aner
in pronounciation is thus inseparable from political corruption The language is
the property ofthe people. Each derives its unity from the other To dispossess
the people oftheir mastery of the language and thus oftheir self-mastery, one must
suspend the spoken element in language. Writing is the very process of the
dispersal of peoples unified as bodies and the beginning oftheir enslavement.
(Derrida, Grammatology 169-70)
Leaving out the distinction between speech and writing, the overall message is clear:
control of text, both spoken and written, shapes and decides the political reality, Derrida's
affirmation of the non-centered linguistic structure is his attempt to repossess "mastery" of
the language from totalitarian forces. By decentering Saussurian structurality and opening
it to free play, Derrida prevents the "totalitarian control" that Heidegger and his political
brethren would impose.
Terry Eagleton explains in The Function ofCriticism that centered structurality, or
the transcendental signified, came to mean for many post-structuralists a form oftyranny.
He points out that
Behind the deconstructive practice of the so-called Yale School would seem to
loom not the shape ofNorth American pragmatism and liberal empiricism, but a
far more minatory shadow, that ofthe holocaust ... Ideology for the Yale school
would seem in the first place to signifY fascism and Stalinism; it is to that traumatic
experience, one imagines, that much of their anxiety over the transcendental
signifier . . . can be traced back. (Eagleton 100-01)
Nihilism then is not a desperate, directionless search for non-existent truth, but a method
to undermine those who would control the political reality by controlling the linguistic
reality. Derrida's "joyous" nihilism finds a purpose that Borges' librarian does not, a
repossession of language from totalitarian ideologies. Religious fulfillment is replaced by
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political fulfillment, or perhaps the two are collapsed, as we recall that the Kabbalah itself
originated in the dark ages as a reaction against a rigid Jewish orthodoxy. Recalling how
-
his adolescent interest in language was shaped by the social and political forces
surrounding hirn, Derrida says IIliterature, or a certain promise of 'being able to say
everything,' was in any case the outline ofwhat was calling me or signaling to me in the
situation I was living in at that time, familial and social ll (Derrida, Acts 39). Though
non-totalizing, a sense of purpose remains intact for Derrida and enables him to '
experience, through the loss of center, linguistic and political IIliberation. 1I Borges, who
was not forced to react to violent totalitarianism in the same way as Derrida, does not
conceive of infinite absence as a form of political rebellion. It seems, at least from the
desperation in liThe Library ofBabel, II that he does not find any relevance or sense of
purpose to lithe infinitell divorced from its religious context. The librarian's directionless
search is not conducted with Derridean-joy, but with nihilistic despair.
The Kabbalists' midrash, their sharing in the divine act of creation, had its own
purpose expressed in the prayer Shema Israel Adonai Elohenu, 110 Israel, your God is on
high. II It was this faith that gave them fulfillment in the potentially absurd act of infinite
textual recombination. We have seen that the origin ofDerrida's joy in the free play of
signifiers might originate in part from his own belief that centerless reality prevents the
kind enslavement or destruction Nazism would impose on his people and his tradition. We
might read this political purpose as Derrida's own prayer, his own Adonai Elohenu, and as
we did with Heidegger's Fuhrer-principle, we might even question whether these prayers
do not indeed provide a center, a IIpresencell at the heart of the text, a "totalization. II
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